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“Redemptive societies” is a term coined by Prasenjit Duara in his article “The 29 
Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism” in 2001, referring to a wave of religious 30 
movements which appeared in Republican China, including the Tongshanshe 同善社, 31 
Daoyuan 道院, Yiguandao 一貫道 and so on, which combined the Chinese tradition 32 
of “syncretic sects” with philanthropy, social engagement, and aspirations to build a new 33 
universal civilization.1 These groups arguably constituted the largest wave of religious 34 
revival in Republican China. The destruction or confiscation of local temples opened a 35 
space for their deterritorialised networks, while elaboration of new formulations of 36 
sovereignty, modernity and civic duty gave them cultural and social significance as 37 
providers of charity and as mediators between Chinese spiritual tradition and modern 38 
constructions of nationhood and universal civilization.2  Redemptive societies were 39 
precursors of the qigong 氣功 movement in the post-Mao People’s Republic and of the 40 
                                                
1  Prasenjit Duara, “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism,” Journal of World History, 12:1 
(2001), pp. 99–130; also in Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003, pp. 89-129. 
2  See Vincent Goossaert and David A. Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011, pp. 91-122.  
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popular Confucian revival of the early 21st century; and they continue to occupy an 41 
important place in the religious landscapes of Taiwan, Vietnam, and among Chinese 42 
diaspora communities in Southeast Asia.3  43 
In spite of their significant role and impact, they remain relatively ignored in 44 
scholarship on religion in modern China, appearing primarily in the mainland 45 
historiography of “reactionary sects and secret societies” 反動會道門  and in 46 
ethnographic works on religion in post-war Taiwan.4  This special double issue (nos. 172 47 
and 173) of Min-su chü-i民俗曲藝 (Journal of Chinese Ritual, Theatre and Folklore) represents 48 
an initial attempt to fill that gap through a selection of articles which critically examine 49 
the category of redemptive societies, present case studies, and explore their interactions 50 
with their socio-political environment and with other types of religious groups.   51 
Redemptive societies were inheritors of the salvationist and millenarian traditions of 52 
the so-called “sectarian” or “White Lotus” movements of late imperial China;5 at the 53 
same time, they demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to adapt to modern social 54 
changes, consciously trying to renew Chinese tradition by appropriating and reinventing 55 
discourses of science, civilization and philanthropy. These groups, which typically had 56 
their own scriptures, a simplified liturgy, a lay congregational mode of association, and 57 
national (or regional) organizations and hierarchies, were closer than the traditional 58 
Buddhist, Daoist or Confucian institutions to the Christian model of the “church” which 59 
had become the paradigm for “religion” in 20th century China.6 Practicing spirit-writing 60 
and/or the breathing and meditation techniques which would later be called qigong, 61 
redemptive societies formed an ideological and spiritual alternative to the anti-traditional 62 
New Culture movement.  63 
 While some redemptive societies, such as the Daoyuan and the Dejiao 德教, 64 
                                                
3  See David A. Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science and Utopia in China, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007; David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007; David K. Jordan and Daniel L. Overmyer, The Flying Phoenix: Aspects of 
Chinese Sectarianism in Taiwan. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Lu Yunfeng, The 
Transformation of Yiguandao in Taiwan: Adapting to a Changing Religious Economy. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2008; Bernard Formoso, De Jiao: A Religious Movement in Contemporary China 
and Overseas: Purple Qi from the East, Singapore: NUS Press, 2010.  
4  For a review of this literature, see Palmer, “Chinese Redemptive Societies” in this issue. For 
translations of representative works, see the special issue on “Recent Chinese Scholarship on the 
History of ‘Redemptive Societies’” edited by David Ownby, Chinese Studies in History vol. 44, no. 
1-2 (2010-2011).   
5  For classic studies, see Daniel Overmyer, Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late 
Traditional China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976; Susan Naquin, “The Transmission 
of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China,” in David Johnson, Andrew J. Nathan and 
Evelyn S. Rawski eds. Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987, pp. 255-291; Barend ter Haar, The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History. 
Leiden: Brill, 1992; Hubert Seiwert (in collaboration with Ma Xisha), Popular Religious Movements 
and Heterodox Sects in Chinese History. Leiden: Brill, 2003.  
6  Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China, chapters 3 and 4.   
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were launched following instructions received in spirit-writing revelations, others, 65 
including the Tongshanshe, the Daode xueshe 道德學社, the Wanguo daodedui 萬國66 
道德會, the Tiande shengjiao 天德聖教 and Yiguandao, were founded or expanded by 67 
such charismatic figures as Peng Huilong 彭迴龍 (1873-1950, a.k.a Peng Tairong 彭泰68 
榮, Peng Ruzun 彭汝尊), Duan Zhengyuan 段正元 (1864-1940), Jiang Xizhang 江希69 
張  (1907-2004), Wang Fengyi 王鳳儀  (1864-1937), Xiao Changming 蕭昌明 70 
(1895-1943), Li Yujie 李玉階 (1901-1994) and Zhang Guangbi 張光璧 (1889-1947, 71 
a.k.a. Zhang Tianran 張天然). Their followers included a large number of military and 72 
political leaders, as well as Confucian activists. Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858-1927), 73 
instigator of the Hundred Days’ Reform 戊戌變法 of 1898, was chairman of the 74 
Wanguo daodehui in the last years of his life. Several premiers, ministers and generals of 75 
the Beiyang, Kuomintang and Japanese puppet regimes were also associated with various 76 
redemptive societies, which maintained deep and complex relations with the political 77 
realm and played an active role in society. The World Red Swastika Society 世界紅卍字78 
會, for example, which was the charitable arm of the Daoyuan, was possibly China’s 79 
largest charitable relief organization in the 1930s. Yiguandao recruited millions of 80 
followers in the 1940s, in the midst of civil war and just as China was coming under 81 
communist control; in the early 1950s, the enemy regimes in Beijing and Taipei both 82 
launched campaigns to eradicate it. While the campaigns largely succeeded in the PRC, 83 
Yiguandao continued to grow as an underground movement in KMT-controlled Taiwan 84 
until, by the time it was legalized in 1987, it had become one of the island’s main 85 
religions and promoters of the Confucian scripture-recitation movement, sending 86 
missionaries to Southeast Asia, South Africa and South America. Also in Taiwan, 87 
Tiandijiao 天帝教, an offshoot of the Tiande shengjiao, became one of the main 88 
organizations practicing qigong on the island, while also hosting congregational rituals and 89 
daily prayers for the reunification of China and Taiwan. In Malaysia, Thailand and 90 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, groups such as the Dejiao have become one of the main 91 
forms of association for diasporic Chinese communities.7 All of these groups now have 92 
their sights on the Chinese mainland, where some of them have already been expanding.8   93 
This double issue of Min-su chü-i is the outcome of two conferences held in June 94 
                                                
7  Formoso, De Jiao and “Chinese Temples and Philanthropic Associations in Thailand.” Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 27.2 (1996): 245-260; Tan Chee-beng. The Development and Distribution 
of Dejiao Associations in Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
1985; Soo Khin Wah, “The Recent Developments of the Yiguan Dao Fayi Chongde Branch in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand,” in Philip Clart and Paul Crowe (ed.), The People and the Dao, 
New Studies in Chinese Religions in Honour of Daniel L. Overmyer, Sankt Augustin, Monumenta 
Serica Monograph Series LX, 2009, pp. 109-125.  
8  See the forthcoming studies by Sébastien Billioud on Yiguandao.  
110408_172期_Introduction (SC) 
4 
2007 and 2009 at the Department of History of Fo Guang University 佛光大學歷史系, 95 
part of a larger project on “Redemptive Societies and Religious Movements in Modern 96 
China,” funded by the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, with 97 
additional support from the École française d’Extrême-Orient 法國遠東學院, the 98 
Centre for East Asian Studies of the Université de Montréal, the Institute of Qing 99 
History of Renmin University of China 中國人民大學清史研究所, and the National 100 
University of Singapore. This project supported field research by historians and 101 
anthropologists based in Hong Kong, Taiwan, mainland China, Japan and Canada.9 A 102 
starting hypothesis of this project was that redemptive societies could be seen as an 103 
identifiable set of groups, with comparable doctrines, practices and organizational forms, a 104 
circulation of followers between groups, successive waves of groups appearing with, in 105 
most cases, rapid cycles of growth and decline, and an overall evolution in phase with 106 
socio-political and ideological changes in Chinese society.  Thus, by tracing the history 107 
and social dynamics of this set of groups, we may observe a dialectic which is not so 108 
much that of a conflict between tradition and modernity, but one of the religious 109 
productions of Chinese modernity.10  110 
Redemptive societies are also of great comparative interest, showing remarkable 111 
similarities with other early 20th century new universalist religious movements and ethical 112 
societies in Asia and the West. These similarities were not lost on the redemptive 113 
societies themselves, which combined spirit-writing with European-inspired spiritism, 114 
and which, in the case of the Daoyuan, merged with the Japanese Ômoto 大本教 115 
movement (see the contribution by DuBois to this issue). The Vietnamese Cao Dai 116 
religion 高臺教 emerged out of a very similar religious culture as China’s, and can be 117 
considered as a redemptive society with a unique inflection related to the French colonial 118 
                                                
9  We would like to especially thank Fan Chun-wu 范純武 and his colleagues for his great efforts in 
organizing both conferences, and David Ownby, co-investigator of this project, for his constant 
support and encouragement. Besides the participants whose contributions appear in this and the next 
issue of this journal, we would also like to acknowledge the precious contributions of other scholars 
who attended one or both conferences: Prasenjit Duara, Cao Xinyu 曹新宇, Chen Jinguo 陳進國, 
Gao Zhihua 高致華, Vincent Goossaert, Komukai Sakurako 小武海櫻子, Lin Guoping 林國平, 
Lin Wanfu 林萬傅, Liu Wenxing 劉文星, Lu Yunfeng 盧雲峰, Lu Zhongwei 陸仲偉, Shao 
Yong 邵雍, Sung Kuang-yu 宋光宇, Tong Chee Kiong 唐志強, Yang Nianqun 楊念群 and 
Chung Yun-ying 鍾雲鶯.  
10  For discussions of this theme, see Adam Chau, “Introduction: revitalizing and innovating religious 
traditions in contemporary China”, in Religion in Contemporary China: Revitalization and 
Innovation, London and New York: Routledge, 2011; Mayfair Yang ed., Chinese Religiosities: 
Afflictions of Modernity and State Formation, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008; and 
Goossaert and Palmer, The Religious Question in Modern China.  
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context of its appearance.11 119 
These groups can all be considered as “New religious movements” (NRMs) 新興120 
宗教運動. There is no scholarly consensus on a definition of NRMs, except that they are 121 
“new” at the time of their appearance in a particular place. How long do they stay “new”? 122 
According to one view, the novelty of NRMs is a function of their being exotic foreign 123 
implants 12  – a conception which is too coloured by the Western experience of 124 
Asian-originated NRMs (and hence exotic to Westerners), to be of any comparative 125 
analytical value. By another perspective, an NRM is a group whose membership consists 126 
entirely of new converts, without second-generation believers.13 On the other hand, 127 
groups almost 200 years old, such as the Mormons, are still often considered as NRMs. 128 
Most Western NRM scholarship has focused on groups that appeared in the West after 129 
World War II;14 the term “NRM,” however, is derived from the Japanese shinshūkyō 新130 
宗教, or shinkō shūkyō 新興宗教 which, in Japanese scholarship, refers to religious 131 
groups which have emerged since the mid 19th century.15 Chinese cases have only 132 
recently entered academic discussions of NRMs, referring to studies of groups such as 133 
Yiguandao, the qigong movement and Falungong.16 Redemptive societies represent one 134 
wave of new religious movements that appeared in China in the first half of the 20th 135 
century. As noted by DuBois in his contribution to this issue, one could argue that there 136 
is often little uniquely “new” about these groups; what is new is rather their innovative 137 
recombinations of elements of older traditions in a new social context. Palmer, in his 138 
contribution to this issue, tries to elaborate an analytical framework for squaring the 139 
continuities and innovations of these groups, by developing a sociological concept of 140 
“salvationist religion” -- successive waves of which have appeared throughout Chinese 141 
history -- and then considering “redemptive societies” as one such wave, which is marked 142 
                                                
11  On Cao Dai, see Jeremy Jammes, “Le caodaïsme: rituels médiumniques, oracles et exégèses : 
approche ethnologique d’un mouvement religieux vietnamien et de ses réseaux.” Ph.D. diss., 
Université Paris-10, 2006.  
12  Gordon Melton, “The Rise of the Study of New Religions,” paper presented at CESNUR 1999, 
Bryn Athyn, Pennsylvania, http://www.cesnur.org/testi/bryn/br_melton.htm; see also Rodney Stark 
and William Sims Bainbridge, The Future of Religion: Secularization, Revival and Cult Formation, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, pp. 24-26. 
13  Eileen Barker, oral comments at the conference on “Religion and Social Integration in Chinese 
Societies: Exploring Sociological Approaches to Religion in the Chinese World”, Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, June 29-30, 2007.  
14  See Eileen Barker, New Religious Movements: A Practical Introduction, London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1989; Timothy Miller, ed., America’s Alternative Religions, Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1995; Lorne L. Dawson, Comprehending Cults: The Sociology of 
New Religious Movements, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
15  See Helen Hardacre, Kurozumikyo and the New Religions of Japan. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988; Peter B. Clarke, Japanese New Religions: In Global Perspective. Richmond: Curzon, 
2000.  
16  See the references in note 3.  
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by the socio-political environment of republican China.    143 
Redemptive societies are known for their syncretism of the Three-in-One 144 
(Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism) or even Five-in-One (adding Christianity and 145 
Islam to the mix); however, some groups place more stress on one tradition over others. 146 
This is especially the case for Confucianism, which is central to the three case studies 147 
presented in this issue, on the Daoyuan (by Thomas DuBois), the Tongshanshe (by 148 
Wang Chien-chuan), and the Daode xueshe (by Fan Chun-wu). These represent three of 149 
the largest and most influential of the redemptive societies. DuBois notes how, although 150 
the collapse of the imperial state brought down with it the institutional and ritual 151 
structure of the Confucian tradition, this was seen by many intellectuals as an 152 
opportunity to renew Confucianism for the modern era. One notable avenue was 153 
through a greater civic engagement: in the case of the Daoyuan, this found expression 154 
through the charitable works of the Red Swastika Society. The core of redemptive society 155 
organizers were members of the traditionally trained literati whose Confucian identity 156 
was reinforced by what they perceived as the moral corruption of the Western values and 157 
institutions being imported by the younger generation of intellectuals trained overseas.17 158 
For them, the social chaos and suffering of China under the new regime was evidence of 159 
the failure of Western models, and proof that Confucianism provided a universalistic 160 
faith and philosophy which could subsume the common moral teachings of all the 161 
world’s religions.  162 
In Wang Chien-chuan’s article, we see the challenges faced by Tongshanshe 163 
organizers in Yunnan as they tried to open a new space in the local intellectual landscape: 164 
more traditionally minded literati accused them of being Daoists and Buddhists, straying 165 
from the “orthodox way,” while modernists attacked them for propagating 166 
“superstition.” Perhaps to avoid such a label, Tongshanshe circulars banned the 167 
spreading of apocalyptic rumours and the practice of spirit-writing – but, as Wang 168 
demonstrates, local chapters were too deeply embedded in the religious milieu, and there 169 
was too much circulation between members of different redemptive societies, 170 
spirit-writing halls and Confucian associations to prevent these practices from occurring 171 
and influencing each other. Tongshanshe emphasized that it was “primarily Confucian” 172 
以儒家為主 and opened National Studies Training Institutes  國學專修館 in several 173 
cities.  174 
Other redemptive societies such as the Wanguo daodehui 萬國道德會 (Universal 175 
Morality Society) and the Daode xueshe 道德學社 (Moral Studies Society), which are 176 
                                                
17  See Henrietta Harrison, The Man Awakened from Dreams: One Man's Life in a North China Village 
1857-1942, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. 
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the subject of Fan Chun-wu’s article, were also active promoters of Confucian learning, 177 
having a discernible impact on the “national studies” 國學 movement of the period. 178 
Fan quotes contemporary observer Cao Juren 曹聚仁 who noted three types of 179 
“national studies” – a more “scientific” approach exemplified by the National Studies 180 
Institute of Peking University 北京大學國學研究所; a more traditional approach 181 
typified by the Wuxi National Studies Training Institute 無錫國學專修館; and what he 182 
dismissively called the “hocus-pocus” 神 怪 的  approach exemplified by the 183 
Tongshanshe’s National Studies Institute in Shanghai. However, as Fan stresses, this 184 
more religious form had a far deeper and lively social base than Hu Shi’s project of 185 
casting National Studies into the museums.  186 
In Li Shyh-wei’s article on post-war Taiwanese Confucian groups, we see how 187 
redemptive societies fit into the broader “Confucian” milieu of the time, which included, 188 
in addition to the Tongshanshe, various spirit-writing halls and poetry societies. In all the 189 
papers, we thus see how redemptive societies were deeply connected with a broader and 190 
multifaceted movement to reform and revitalise Confucianism, which ranged from small 191 
spirit-writing cults to more secular tendencies associated with the “national essence” 國192 
粹 intellectual movement. Redemptive societies were organized, religious actors which 193 
simultaneously occupied several positions on this spectrum, often growing out of 194 
spirit-writing halls but partaking in more modern formulations of National Studies and 195 
civic engagement. As Wang Chien-chuan notes in his article, even the Wuxi National 196 
Studies Training Institute (contrasted by Cao Juren to the “hocus-pocus” type) was 197 
founded by a member of the Tongshanshe. And all three papers by DuBois, Wang and 198 
Fan mention the connections between their case studies and the Confucian Religion 199 
Society 孔教會, founded at Qufu in 1913 and which was attended by the child prodigy 200 
Jiang Xizhang, himself a future founder of the Universal Morality Society, another one of 201 
the largest redemptive societies. Later, Yiguandao would also carry the Confucian mantle; 202 
today, it identifies itself as primarily Confucian, and is a leading promoter of the 203 
Confucian classics-recitation movement on Taiwan.  204 
The scholarship on Confucianism has almost completely ignored these redemptive 205 
societies, and is only beginning to recognize the religious dimensions of the tradition. 206 
The case studies presented here offer evidence for what might be called a wave of 207 
Confucian NRMs in the Republican period, some of which continue to grow today. This 208 
is but one of many potential implications of recent research on redemptive societies – 209 
implications which will undoubtedly open a host of new questions for debate and issues 210 
for further research.  211 
